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Public Policy toward  if a developing country
government is  not good at Nongovernmental  providing public services  such
O rganizatio  s  in  *as  health  care, education,
and social  protection, would
Developing Countries  NGOs be better at doing so?
What advantages do NGOs
have over for-proftt providers
William Jack  of publicly funded services?
And considering the
importance of donor funding,
which is  better for delivering
such services,  an international
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Summary findings
Jack presents two descriptive models of  NGOs also provide useful real and financial links with
nongovernmentaf organizations and poses normative  external donors. They are used to provide services the
questions about public policy toward NGOs. In  government favors and donors are willing to fund. In this
situations in which optimal government intervention  in a  model, the service provider is chosen to yield the best
distorted or inequitable economy employs an NGO-like  outcome for both government and donor.
body, he considers which kinds of NGO might be used.  In this context, Jack compares an international NGO
First, in many developing countries NGOs participate  and a grassroots organization.
in the delivery of what are essentially private goods-in  It may be more efficient to transfer donor  funds
particular, health care and education. In an economy  through an international NGO than through a local
without NGOs, there may be good redistributive and  NGO, but when donor-government  cooperation  fails, a
efficiency reasons for the government to provide these  project implemented by an international NGO is
goods in kind. But if direct government provision of such  effectively killed. If a project implemented by a local
services is ineffective or inefficient, when is contracting  organization can limp along, this otherwise less efficient
out to an NGO-like institution preferable to using a  organization might be preferred.
traditional  for-profit firm? (Another way to frame this is
to ask: What is the optimal taxation and regulation of
private providers of publicly financed services?)
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Group  at  the  World  Bank.0.1  Introduction
This  paper  is a first  attempt  at  writing  down  some descriptive  models  of non-governmental  or-
ganizations  with  which to  pose and  evaluate  normative  questions  regarding  public  policy  towards
these  institutions.  One  approach  to the  normative  study  of NGOs  is to begin  with  a definition  of
what  an  NGO  is and  how  it behaves,  and  then  to make  welfare  comparisons  among  alternative
policies  that  might  be  adopted.  For  example,  Besley  and  Ghatak  (2000)  quote  the  UN  Inter-
agency  Committee  on  Integrated  Rural  Development  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (1992)  as listing
six defining characteristics  of NGOs:  they  are voluntary,  non-profit,  service  and  development  ori-
ented,  autonomous  from  the  government  or political  parties,  have a high degree of motivation  and
commitment,  and  some form  of formal  registration.  However, this  list  encompasses  such  a broad
range  of organizations  that  it is  difficult  to  make  precise  positive  predictions  or,  on  that  basis,
normative  prescriptions.
Instead,  this  paper  will  approach  the  issue  from  a  different  perspective.  There  are  well
understood  reasons  for  government  intervention  in  the  economy  - viz.  the  correction  of  market
failures  (externalities  and  public  goods)  and  the  redistribution  of income.  If an  institution  that
calls  itself an  NGO  neither  contributes  to market  failures  nor adversely  affects  the distribution  of
income,  then  there  is no reason  for the  government  to  intervene  in  its  activities.  On  the  other
hand,  it  may  well be  the  case  that  mechanisms  by which  a government  intervenes  in a distorted
or inequitable  economy  include  the  use of agents  or groups  of agents  that  look like NGOs  in some
respects.  Thus  the  approach  of this  paper  is to examine  situations  in which  optimal  government
intervention  is characterized  by the  employment  of an  NGO-like  body.
Two features  of potential  NGO  involvement  are highlighted  here.  First,  in many  countries  of
the  developing  world,  NGOs  participate  in the  delivery  of what  are  essentially  private  goods  - in
particular  health  and education.  In an economy without  NGOs,  there  may  be good redistributive
and efficiency reasons  for the government  to provide  these  goods  in kind (Besley  and  Coate,  1991).
1Here we ask,  If direct  government  provision  of such  services  is ineffectual  or very  inefficient,  when
is  contracting  out  to  an  NGO-like  institution  preferred  to  using  a  traditional  for-profit  firm?
Alternatively,  identifying  the  tax  and  regulatory  treatment  of  the  provider  as  determining  its
NGOness,  this  question  can  be  rephrased  as  What  is the  optimal  taxation  and  regulation  of
private  providers  of publicly  financed  services?
The  second feature  of NGOs in developing  countries  that  seems important  is their  financial  and
real  links  with  external  donors.  NGOs  are  used not  only to provide  services  that  the  government
favors,  but  also those  that  donor  agencies  are  willing  to  fund.  In the  model  of the  second  main
section  of this  paper  then,  the  type  of provider  of these  services  is chosen  to  yield the  best  joint
outcome  for the government  and donor.  I provide an  interpretation  in which use of an international
NGO  and  a grass  roots  NGO  can  be  compared.  There  are two  essential  differences  between  the
two  kinds  of  NGO  in  this  model.  First,  transferring  donor  funds  to  the  international  NGO  is
more  efficient  than  transferring  them  to  the  grass  roots  organization.  However,  secondly,  when
government-donor  cooperation  fails, a project  implemented  by an international  NGO  is effectively
killed,  while  it  is assumed  that  one  implemented  by a  grass  roots  organization  can  limp  along.
Thus  the  normative  analysis  does  not  focus  on the  NGO  versus  for-profit  firm  question,  but  on
the  kind of NGO  chosen to  implement  a desired  policy.
Both of these  models place limits  on the ability  of governments,  donors,  and/or  providers  to sign
enforceable  contracts.  In  the  first  model,  inability  to  make  contractual  commitments  regarding
the quality  of the  service produces  divergent  behavior  of NGOs and other  private  providers.  In the
second  model,  it  is the  inability  of the  government  and  the  donor  to  write  enforceable  contracts
that  means  the choice  of NGO  (which corresponds  to an  allocation  of authority  between  the  two)
has  substantive  effects on incentives.
The  next  section  presents  some  background  information  on  NGOs  in  developing  countries.
Section  3 describes  a model  in which a firm's  quality  and  cost  responds  to its  degree  of NGOness,
and  the implications  for government  contracting.  Section  4 introduces  external  donors  in a model
2that  differentiates between international and grass roots NGOs.  Section 5 concludes with some
suggestions of empirical strategies that  might  be followed  in testing the  models and  informing
policy.
1  Some  background
In contrast to the growing body of work on non-profit institutions  in the United States and other
developed economies  (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1996), there has been little systematic work on NGOs,
and appropriate public policies towards them, in developing and transition  countries. This is not
because they play only a minor role in these economies. For example, there were over 1,000  NGOs
active in Bangladesh in the early 1990s (Stocker and Barbor-Might, 1999, p.  7). Similarly, there
are more NGOs in Uganda than for-profit enterprises. The increased prominence of the non-profit
sector has had a significant impact on World Bank operations: in 1989, only 20 percent of World
Bank-supported projects had provisions  for NGO involvement, but by 1997,  this had increased to
46 percent of projects (World Bank, 1999).
The  issue is also important  in the  transition countries, where there  has  been a substantial
breakdown in public services. In addition to cutbacks in purely commercial activities of govern-
ment, many countries have reduced public good provision, in areas such as health care, education
and social protection.  Some commentators are asking whether these goods and services could be
better provided by NGOs.
Many of the  questions about  NGO behavior in developing economies are similar to those in
developed countries. How do NGOs finance their operations (e.g., through donations, government
payments and grants, support from donors, or user fees)? Which sectors are dominated by NGOs
and  in which do they  coexist with other providers (i.e., government agencies and for-profit en-
terprises)?  What are the  advantages, and  disadvantages, of NGO provision that  allow them to
continue to operate in sectors where for-profit firms are active?  Do NGOs serve different clients
3or areas than  other providers? Do they provide different levels of product or service quality? Are
they more cost efficient? How do government contracts affect the behavior of NGOs? These kinds
of questions motivate the model of the following  section.
In addition to questions that apply in both developed and developing economies, other issues
arise more specifically in developing economies. The most important of these is undoubtedly the
question of how interaction with donors affects NGO behavior (Stocker and Barbor-Might, 1999).
Many of the  presumed benefits of NGO activities derive from a  belief that  NGO workers
are more diligent and  better  motivated than  their  counterparts  in other organizations,  such a
private firms and government bureaucracies. On oft-cited manifestation of this is innovation.  As
Riddell and  Robinson  (page 35) remark,  "NGOs pride themselves on being  innovative, in the
sense of introducing new techniques as well as  in fostering novel forms of social organization."
However, these authors  also note that  less enthusiastic observers point to the  slow response of
some NGOs, their  cumbersome decision making processes, and in-fighting (page 38).  Both  the
internal organization of NGOs as well as the motivation of the workers they employ likely  jointly
affect NGO outcomes.
Another sometimes important aspect of NGOs is the degree of trust  shared between its work-
ers and  consumers of the  goods and services produced, especially in the  case of health  care.  In
countries where government bureaucrats  have reputations for low quality service or outright ex-
ploitation, NGOs start  with a comparative advantage (although not necessarily compared with
other private providers). Again, the underlying motivation of the NGO staff seems to be important
in this respect.
2  NGO  status  and  commitment  to  quality
In a recent paper, Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) have used an incomplete contracts model to argue
that non-profit status may serve as a mechanism  by which firms can credibly commit to maintain-
4ing quality.  In their  model, the essential feature of being a non-profit is that  profits can not  be
consumed  efficiently  by the firm owners, but must be consumed in kind as perquisites.  This lowers
the return to cost-reducing effort, and, under the assumption that  such effort also reduces quality,
reduces the incentive of the firm to deliver sub-standard goods.  Anticipating this, consumers are
willing to pay higher prices.  When choosing NGO status,  the firm compares the gains associated
with higher prices against the loss of having to consume profits inefficiently. We will examine the
choice made by a purchaser (the government) who can contract out service provision to either an
NGO or for-profit firm.
One way in which the model of this section can be interpreted in contrast with that  of Glaeser
and  Shleifer is that  in their  model, non-profit status  is used as a  signaling  mechanism on the
supply side - i.e., by firms, while here it is used as a screening  device on the  demand side - i.e.,
by the government (i.e., the purchaser).'
2.1  The  effects  of effort
The assumption of the Glaeser and Shleifer analysis that  cost reducing effort necessarily lowers
quality  appears to  miss at  least  one aspect  of the  NGO story - that  is,  that  NGOs have an
independent preference for quality, in some sense. One indication of this  is the  extent to which
they rely on volunteer (or apparently under-paid) labor, and other uncompensated contributions.
It  would seem more realistic to  assume that  effort, however construed,  instead  of necessarily
reducing quality, has the effect of changing the trade-off between non-effort costs and quality. 2
Specifically,  consider the provision of a single unit of a good (e.g., health coverage for a village)
and suppose monetary costs are c(q, e), where q > 0 is the quality of output  and e >  0 is the effort
the provider exerts.  We assume cq > 0, cqq > 0, c,  < 0, Cee > 0 and Cqe  <  0: there are decreasing
I The  literature  on signaling  almost  always  entails  an environment  of asymmetric  information.  Glaeser  and
Shleifer's  model is one of symmetric  information,  so the  terminology  is employed a little  loosely here.  Later,  our
model will incorporate  an element  of asymmetric  information.
2  This  could occur  within  a model  of two  types  of effort, one  that  was directed  at  cost  control,  the  other  at
quality  improvement.  If the  two efforts are substitutes,  a higher total  effort level could conceivably  lead to  lower
costs  and higher quality.
5returns  to quality,  and  effort  reduces  costs,  given  quality,  at  a declining  rate.  Also,  normalize
quality  and  effort  so that  c(O,  0) = 0.
Following Glaeser  and Shleifer,  suppose  the purchaser  (i.e., the  government)  has agreed  to pay
a price p  for the  good,  but  that  the  quality  is non-contractible.  If the  provider  cares  only  about
net  revenues  r =  p - c(q, e) (consumed  efficiently  or not)  and the  non-pecuniary  costs of effort,  e,
it is clear  that  he  will have  no incentive  to  provide  any quality  above  zero  (a normalized  minimal
level),  nor  any  effort.  That  is,  in the  formulation  of Glaeser  and  Shleifer,  the  entrepreneur's
objective  is
7rd = d(p-c(q,e))  -e
where  d  <  1 represents  the  efficiency with  which  cash  receipts  are  consumed  and  d  <  1 for an
NGO.  Thus  the  more  heavily  restricted  is the  provider's  use of revenues,  the lower  is d.  Given  p,
this  is maximized  by setting  q =  e =  0.
But  suppose  the entrepreneur  derives some  utility  from  the  quality  of the  good  provided,  aq.
We can  interpret  this  as altruism,  in-kind  compensation  for  contributors,  or  the  pursuit  of some
non-monetary  goal.  Then
7rd =  d(p-c(q,  e))-e+aq  (1)
and  the first  order  conditions  for an interior  solution  (which  we shall assume  to be  sufficient)  are
ce  =  - (2)
andcq  =  d
Total  differentiation  of these  conditions  shows that  quality  and effort  both  increase  with  a.  That
is, as long as the  second  order  conditions  are satisfied  (i.e.,  (cqqcee,-,c)  > 0),
*/(ci)  Cee  > 
=  (CqqCee -C2e)
and
e*I(o,)  =  Ceq  >
(Cqq6Cee
62.2  The  impact  of NGO  status  on quality,  effort,  and  cost
In the model of Glaeser and Shleifer, NGO status,  that  is d < 1, has the unambiguous effect of
reducing the return to, and hence equilibrium  level of, effort. Here however there is a countervailing
effect: as d falls, the relative price of the  implicit benefits of quality compared with monetary
income, which equals a/d,  increases.  This induces the firm to increase quality,  which in turn
increases the  return  to effort (since the  cost reduction effect of effort is larger when quality is
higher). To examine which effect dominates, we totally differentiate the two first order conditions
above with respect to d, and find
q*l(d) =  1  (  acee + Cqe
dP \CqqCee-Cqe
Assuming the  second order condition is satisfied the  firm's quality choice increases with NGO
status as d falls below 1 (i.e., q*'(d) < 0) if and only if
acee  +  Cqe > 0.
Solving the  first order conditions (2) for a  and  substituting  we find that  NGO status  leads to
higher quality if and only if3
cq  cqe  (3)
Ce  Cee
If condition (3) holds, then the  purchaser of the good or service, who anticipates this effect,
will be willing to pay  a  higher price to  an NGO provider than  a for-profit provider.  Similar
3 This  is satisfied if the slope of the  constant  cost curve in  (q, e)-space is always greater  than  that  of the  curve
along which ce  is constant:
de  > de|




NGO status  yields higher quality  if and only  if
Cee >  Cqe.
7calculations  show that  NGO  status  leads  to higher  effort,  that  is e*'(d)  < 0,  if and  only  if 4
r-, 1  cqq  ~~~~~~~~~~(4)
Ce  cqe
Thus  NGOs  produce  higher  quality  output  and  exert  higher  effort  if both  (3) and  (4)  hold.
To gain  a little  intuition  for what  these  conditions  mean,  let us consider  the  case of separable
cost  functions,  wherein
c(q, e) = g(e)h(q)
with  g'  < 0, g"  > 0, h'  >  0, and  h"  > 0.  Then  condition  (3) becomes  simply
9  I,
9  >  1.
In  the  special  case  where  the  marginal  effect of effort  is proportional  to  the  level,  that  is,  when
g(e)  = k exp(--ye),  NGO  status  has no impact  on the quality  chosen,  that  is gg"/lg
2 =  1.  Similarly,
with  e bounded  away from zero,  if g(e)  = k/e,  gg"/g'
2 = 2, so quality  increases  with  NGO  status.5
Also, with  a multiplicative  specification,  condition  (4)  reduces  to
h /2
In  this  case,  if h  is a power  function,  h(q)  =  kql,  for any  n  >  1, the  left  hand  side  is equal  to





Writing  Ciq  as  the  elasticity  of  ci  with  respect  to  q, this  reduces  to
Eqq  >  Eeq.
Another  interpretation  of  this  condition  is  as  a  kind  of  decreasing  returns.  Treating  g'  as  a  function  of  g,
gg"Ig"  can  be  written  as
g  cg
This  elasticity  being  greater  than  one  is  equivalent  to  requiring  that  9'  is decreasing  and  concave  in  g.
6 This  condition  can  be  thought  of  as  a  similar  kind  of decreasing  returns  as  in  the  previous  footnote.  Treating
h'  as  a  function  of  h,  the  condition  h'
2 /hh"  >  1  is  equivalent  to  requiring  that  h'  be  an  increasing  and  convex
function  of  h.
8The net impact of these changes in quality and effort on monetary costs is of course ambiguous.
Using the first order conditions for effort and quality choice, the  derivative of equilibrium costs
with respect to NGO status can be written
c*'(d)  =  [c'cqq - 2cCqCeq + Ci Cee].
Using the multiplicatively separable specification, this reduces to
c (d  )  =  Z
2 CCe  [K(h  - 1) + (9"  1)]
-[Te + Tq]
where C <  0,  Te is the  first term  inside the  square brackets, and  Tq the  second.  Thus when
NGO status  leads to higher effort (Te < 0)  and lower quality (Tq < 0),  costs fall (c*I(d) > 0).
Similarly, when NGO status leads to lower effort and higher quality, costs increase. In the range
of particularly interest, when NGO status raises quality (Tq > 0) and costs (Te < O), the effect on
costs is ambiguous.
2.3  Welfare  implications
Which type of firm should the government choose?  That  is, if the government contracts out the
provision of a service, under what  conditions should it require the  provider to be  a non-profit
organization?
We will assume that  the government chooses its procurement policy - i.e., the kind of organi-
zation from which to purchase - so as to maximize a welfare function of the  form
W  = V(q)-(1  +  A)p  +  rd-
V(q)  is the gross surplus generated by services  of quality q, and A > 0 is the marginal excess  burden
associated with a distortionary tax system used to raise the funds needed to purchase the services.
(Thus V(q)  - (1 - A)p  is the consumers' net benefit.) Td  is the  (real value of the) profit earned by
the provider (see 1), and  3 E [0,1] is the relative social value of provider benefits compared with
9consumer benefits. Denoting the net economic  cost of production by r(q, e; d) = c(q, e)+(e-caq)/d,
social welfare can be written
W  =  V(q)  -(1  + A)f'(q, e; d) - I  -3)  7rd
For d < 1, ((1 + A)/d - 1) > 0, so the firm's profits should be as low as possible.  Assuming the
firm cannot be forced to suffer losses, this reduces to lrd  =  0.  From (1), the government sets
p =  T(q, e; d).
For example, for a for-profit firm, it sets a price large enough to  cover monetary costs plus the
costs of effort, less the  in-kind benefit that  accrues to the  firm due to its  valuation of quality.
For the  same quality and  effort choices, a  non-profit firm or NGO with  d  <  1 must  be  paid
more.  Clearly then, if the government wished to purchase services at minimum cost, it would not
choose an NGO unless the quality and cost of NGO provision differed from for-profit firms in the
appropriate fashion. Indeed, if the cost function is of the form
c(q,e) = kexp(-7e)q',
then as shown above, NGO status has no impact on quality and  a positive impact on effort, so
provision by an  NGO could be preferred.  The lower production  costs would need to  be offset
against potentially higher financing costs.
Formally, the government's problem is to choose d to solve
max  V(q) - (1 + A)F(q,  e; d)
subject to  q = qy(d) and e = e*(d).
Alternatively, in a discrete choice model, the government can choose either a for-profit firm (d = 1)
or an NGO (d = d' < 1). NGO provision is preferred if and only if
V(qN)-(1  + A)r(qN,eN;d')  >  V(qF)-(1  +A)r(qF,  eF; 1)
or V(qN)  -V(qF)  >  (1 + A)[r(qN,  eN; d') - r(qF,  eF;  1))
10where XN  =  x*(d/) and  XF  =  x*(1).  Thus NGO provision is preferred if the  gross benefits of
higher quality outweigh the increased financing costs. In the special case c(q, e) = k exp(-ye)q T ,
NGO provision is preferred as long as
r(qN,  eN; d')  < r  (qF, eF; 1)
or
c(q,  eN)  +  (eN  - aq)/d'  < c(q, eF) + (eF - aq)
which reduces to
19(eF)  - 9(eN)]h(q)  > eN - eF - 77q
where 77  = a(,  -1)  > 0. The left hand side is equal to the cost savings due to higher effort, and
the  right hand  side represents the higher financing costs needed to compensate the  firm for its
increased effort, net of the implicit value of quality.
2.4  Screening  contracts
Suppose the  government is uncertain  as  to the  rate  at  which implicit quality-related  benefits
accrue to a firm, a.  Firms with high values of a  are attractive  providers as they are cheaper to
finance, but even firms with lower a  values might be preferred to no provision at all (or whatever
the  alternative is).  Offering firms the  choice between NGO status  and for-profit, coupled with
corresponding pricing policies, might allow the government to effectively sort the firms according
to their  types. In general at  least one type of firm will earn a rent in this situation,  so the zero-
profit condition will not bind for all firms. Welfare is lower than in the first best, but higher than
applying the same procurement terms to all firms.
To examine this issue, let us consider d as a continuous variable once again,  Throughout this
subsection we shall assume that  NGO status  raises quality, i.e., that  condition (3) holds.  The
profit of an a-type firm that  is paid a price p and that  must consume profits with efficiency  d, is
r*  (p, d; a)  = max d(p - c(q, e)) - e + aq
11Using the envelope theorem, the slope of a firm's constant  profit curve in (d, p)-space is
dp  [_i  - c(q*(d,  a), e*(d,  a))J
dd,r=cOnst  d
- [p-c  (d,a)]
d
which is negative for all points at which the financial transfer to the firm at least covers monetary
costs. 7 It can be shown that,  under the same conditions as in (3), monetary costs are higher the
higher is a, in which case the constant profit curves become flatter as a  increases. 8
I will assume the iso-profit curves to be convex, that  is
d2p  2(p-c*)  ldc*  O
d7  LCOUSt  d2  d Ad
(The first term in this expression is positive as long as the firm doesn't  make a loss. The second
could be positive or negative, although in the specific  example above, with exponential and power
functions, it is negative.  In this case we assume the first dominates over the relevant range.)
Let us also examine social welfare in (d,  p)-space. To simplify, assume ,  = 0.  Then
W =  V(q'(d,  a)) - (1 + A)p
with iso-welfare  curves of slope
dp |  V'(q*)q;(d, a)
ddw  1+A
Assuming NGO status increases quality, this slope is negative. I shall assume the slope is decreas-
ing, so iso-welfare  curves are concave to the origin. Also, reasonable conditions on the underlying
functions ensure that  as a  increases, this slope gets (algebraically) smaller. 9
I This  will be the  case whenever effort costs  are more than  the implicit  benefits  of quality,  which seems to  be
the  interesting  case.
8  To see this, note  that
8c  /Oc  =  8c  /4q  x 
8 q/aa  +iOc/8e  x 8e/8a
=  (cqcee  -c.c.
where  A  > O is the  second order  condition  term.  Thus  9c/9a  >  o  if and  only if the  numerator  is positive.  But
this  is just  condition  (3).
9 Indeed,  as long as 8
2q/adact  < 0,  then a
2p/Odaa  < 0.
12Thus we can draw Figures ??  and  3.  Figure  ?? shows the  case of full information.  The
government knows which kind of firm it is dealing with,  and specifies an efficiency  parameter  d
(the degree of NGOness) and  a price p, to maximize welfare subject  to a zero profit constraint.
The optimal contracts are thus XH  =  (dH, PH) if it procures services from a firm with a high value
of a,  and XL  =  (dL,PL)  if it purchases from a firm with a low value of a,  as shown in the figure.
The qualitative feature of this pair of contracts is that  under both, the firm is paid approximately
the same price for the  service (i.e., PL c:  PH), but the firm that  values quality more is required to
act as an NGO (that  is, dL  >  dH).
When firms are free to choose between these contracts, both types will choose the contract  at
XL,  which provides  aL-types  with  zero  profits,  but  aH-types  with  positive  profits.  Thus  the  pair
(aL,  aH)  is not  incentive  compatible.  An  incentive  compatible  pair  of contracts  must  satisfy  the
particular  constraint  that  an  acH-type will prefer  the  contract  proposed  for it  than  that  proposed
for the  other  type  of firm.
In  Figure  ??,  the  case  of  asymmetric  information  is  shown.  Depending  on  the  proportion
of  aH  and  aL  types  in  the  population,  the  incentive  compatible  optimum  is to  offer  the  two
contracts  iH  =  (dH,PH)  and  XL  =  (dL, PL).  As drawn  in the  figure,  the  first  best  contracts
are  characterized  by  the  two  types  of  firm  continuing  to  have  relatively  different  NGO  status
(that  is,  dH  < dL).  However,  the  incentive  constraint  also  means  that  the  aH-type  firms must
be  paid  relatively  more  in  order  to  induce  self-selection.  Indeed,  firms with  low implicit  quality
valuations  self-select  and  accept  for-profit  status  at  a low price,  while  those  with  high  implicit
quality  valuations  choose the  contract  that  pays  a higher  price,  but  under  the  condition  that  the
firm  adopts  NGO  status.
3  Donors,  governments,  and  NGO  choice
In  many  circumstances  it  is  useful  to  think  of  NGOs  as  having  links  with  both  a  government
and  an  external  donor.  These  links  facilitate  financial  flows - that  is,  donors  and  governments
13each provide resources for NGO activities, but  they also involve aspects  of control.  That  is,
the  financing is not unconditional and  lump-sum.  In this section I will use the  ideas developed
in Besley and  Ghatak  (2000) and Jack (2000), which derive from the  more general literature  on
incomplete contracts of Grossman and  Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), to examine the
role of NGOs in the design of government-donor interactions.
NGOs serve as important  vehicles for the  delivery of foreign assistance  to poor  countries.
(Riddell and Robinson (page 32) report that the largest component of external aid directed through
NGOs was in  the  form of cofinancing of development projects  (the  other  financier being the
government.'"  ))  In this section we consider an international donor and  a national government
each with its own preferences over the provision of some service.  The two parties need to delegate
the responsibility for delivery of the service to an agent. We compare two organizational structures.
In the first structure  the donor and  the  government directly contribute  resources to the  agent,
while in the second more vertical relationship donor funds are channelled through the government
to the agent.
Within the context of standard incentive theory, the first structure represents a common agency
problem (see e.g., Martimort, 1996),  while the second is a multi-layered principal-agent model (Laf-
font 1990, and  Tirole, 1986). In this  paper we abstract  from the information  asymmetries that
underpin this strand of the incentives  literature, and that determine optimal mechanisms/contracts
that  govern relationships between the parties. Instead we focus on the inability of the two princi-
pals (the government and the donor) to write and abide by any contract.
In comparing these two alternative  organizational forms, we should use the  well-being of a
country's citizens to judge their relative merits.  Certainly, the preferences of donors and govern-
ments are likely to differ, and it is not always clear which of these should be used as a normative
base.  NGOs that  provide credit for low income individuals and thereby correct a capital market
10 Roger C. Riddell and Mark  Robinson, Non-Governmental  Organizations  and Rural  Poverty  Alleviation,  Over-
seas Development  Institute,  London, Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1995.
14failure might  be valued and  supported by a  government, but those whose primary objective is
to support  political organization of the poor might  not be. Similarly, NGOs that  focus on the
provision of health  and/or  education services typically serve a redistributive  role (depending on
the  source of financing), as do those with gender-specific goals (although there are potential ef-
ficiency benefits from all of these redistributive actions, say if children's health  increases with
redistribution of income from men to women).  In these cases, the  government's objectives may
differ widely from those of an international donor.
3.1  A  model  of  international  and  grass  roots  NGOs
Consider a  project that  is to  be implemented through  an  agent.  Implementation  requires the
inputs of a donor, ed,  and the government, eg. Two scenarios will be considered. Under the first,
the  two parties engage an international NGO to implement the  project.  This NGO may or may
not be closely linked with the donor itself.  The important  point is that  the  inputs of both the
donor and the  government are made directly to the project,  managed by the  NGO.  Under the
second scenario, a grass-roots NGO is engaged.  This NGO has no formal links with the donor,
so the donor's inputs  into the  project must be channelled through the government. This kind of
resource transfer might be identified as technical assistance, as opposed to the direct provision of
inputs into production.
The behavior of the  NGO itself is passive, although one can interpret  the input  of the  gov-
ernment as the provision of incentives for performance by the NGO. Under the first scenario, the
quality of output produced by the NGO is q =  v(ed, e 9 ), which is increasing and concave in both
arguments.  However, in the  second scenario when the  donor contribution  must  be channelled
through the  government, it becomes less productive,  and the quality of the  output  of the grass
roots NGO is reduced to q =  -yv(ed,e 9 ),  where fy <  1.
The second organizational form (grass roots NGO delivery), while less efficient, has the  ad-
vantage that it can continue to implement the project if cooperation between the government and
15the donor breaks down.  We can think of the government learning about the production  process
as a result of the donor's (otherwise less efficient) technical assistance. The quality of the project
is then  q =  y'v(ed, eg), where ty' < -y.  However, with an international NGO, donor participation
is essential in the sense that  without it, the quality of the project is very low. Indeed, we assume
q = 0 in this case.
The donor and  government value quality differently: the  gross benefit to the  government is
99q and that  to the donor is Odq.  They also care about the costs of the inputs, so the objective of
the government is to maximize 09q - e9,  and that  of the donor is to maximize Odq  - ed. Even if
one of the parties pulls out of the partnership, it still derives benefits from any quality that  turns
out to be produced.
3.1.1  Payoffs under  international  NGO  implementation
We follow  the standard  assumption in these kinds of models and assume Nash bargaining over the
ex post surplus after inputs  have been sunk.  Since the  value of output  is zero when bargaining
breaks  down, in this  case, the  net  ex post surplus  is the  same as the  gross ex post  surplus,
(Og  + Od)v(ed,  e9), which is shared equally between the two parties at the Nash solution. Thus the
ex ante payoff to the government is
OV(ed,  e 9) -e
where 6 is the mean of the Os. The government chooses its input  level to satisfy the  first order
condition
6v9(ed, eg) =  1.  (5)
Similarly, the ex ante payoff to the donor is
Ov(ed, e9) - ed
yielding the first order condition
Ovd(ed, e9)  =  1.  (6)
16Let us denote the (Nash) equilibrium input choices  defined by (5) and (6) by (el, eg). Employment
of an international NGO is akin to joint ownership of the project.  Joint ownership means neither
party has control rights over the project's assets in the event of a break down in bargaining, so it
effectively  languishes unused when the parties disagree.
3.1.2  Payoffs under  grass-roots  NGO  implementation
The net ex post surplus that  is bargained over in this case is different to that  when the project is
implemented by an international NGO. The gross ex post surplus (ignoring input costs) is smaller,
and equal to -Y(Od +  g 9)v(ed, e9).  Also, some surplus - equal to 7'(Od + O 9)v(ed, e9) - is generated
when bargaining breaks down, so the  net surplus is smaller still.  Each party's  ex ante payoff is
equal to its outside option plus half the net surplus, less the cost of inputs.
Thus, the government's ex ante payoff is
YOgv(ed, e,)  +  (7-)(Od  + Og)v(ed,  e) _eg
Government's  outside  option  Half the gains  from  trade
--  (7  +  7'\AO)  V(ed,  e9 )  -e
where AO = (9O  - Od)/2. The input e9 is thus chosen by the government to satisfy
(7@  +  y'AO) vg(ed, eg) = 1.  (7)
The donor's ex ante payoff is
-Y'OdV(ed, eg)  +  (  7y)(Od  + Og)v(ed,  e9)  ed
Donor's  outside  option  Half tbe  g2ins from  trade
(-y  - -y'AO)  v(ed,  e,)  - ed
which is maximized  when  ed satisfies
(y  -YA'O) vd(ed, e9) =  1.  (8)
Denote the solutions to (7) and (8) by (eGR,  eGR).
173.2  Comparative  statics
To arrive a simple comparative statics results, let us assume that  v(.,.)  is additively separable:"
v(ed,  eg)  =  nd'(ed)  +  7j9 ,b(ed)-
Then it is easy to show that  under a grass roots NGO the inputs  of  both the  government and
the donor are lower than  with international NGO provision if and only if the  difference between
the preference parameters  is small enough.  In particular,  ed and  eg both  fall under grass roots
provision if and only if" 2
Outside this  interval,  the  directions of change of the  two inputs  differ.  When  ted  >
evR  > ei  and eCR < el,  while for  1  <-  ),  eGR  <  eI  and  eGR > el
Thus  when donor  and  government valuations of the  service do not  differ much, provision
through an international NGO yields higher inputs from both, and higher joint surplus compared
with grass roots provision (see Figure 4).13  When the government's valuation of service quality
is sufficiently higher than  the  donor's, grass roots provision (which corresponds to government
ownership) increases the government's input,  but reduces the  donor's.  Symmetrically, when the
donor's valuation is sufficiently  greater than  the government's, grass roots provision increases the
donor's input but  reduces the government's.
Note that  max IAG/0I =  1, so that  if (1 - -y)/y' > 1, then grass roots provision always leads to
lower inputs from the  donor and the government. This happens whenever Y  < 1/2,  or else when
I'  Besley and Ghatak  (2000)  employ a similar  assumption.  In our  specification,  we write v(ed, e9) = V7dO(ed)  +
,7,O(eg) with  0(.)  and if(.)  increasing and  concave.  Our earlier  assumptions  mean  that  under  (cooperative)  grass
roots  NGO provision,  quality  is .y[Td0(ed) + nS'(eg)], and when bargaining  breaks  down in this  situation,  quality
is -'[1,7d(ed)  + 7'7i4(eg)]. Thus  the organizational  structure  effects  the productivity  of both  the donor  input  and
the government  input.  Besley and Ghatak  (as applied to the  environment we model)  assume that  the  effect is only
on the  productivity  of the donor  input,  in which case quality  is v,dO(ed)  + i79 ,(e 9 ) when  the  grass roots  NGO  is
used cooperatively, for example.  The qualitative  nature  of the comparative  statics  results  are unaffected,  although
they  are more symmetric  under  our normalization.
12  eOR  Z el  if and only  if (-y7  +  y'O)  ,and  edGR Z el  if and only if (@o  - YA9)  Z6.
13 Joint  surplus  increases  because  we know that  under  international  NGO  provision,  inputs  are below the joint
surplus  maximizing  levels, characterized  by 29vi = 1, for i =  g, d.
18'is  significantly less the  y.
The reason for this symmetry lies in the  public good nature of the  output.  By employing a
grass roots NGO, and thus relinquishing direct involvement in the project,  a donor improves the
outside options of both itself and the government. If one of the parties values the  output enough,
the improvement in the outside option, and hence in the  returns to effort offset the reduction in
such returns due to the less efficient technology used.
4  Empirical  implications
It is hoped that  the models above can help to guide empirical research on the  behavior of NGOs,
and to thus inform policy decisions regarding them.  In light of the discussion of section 3, two
sets of empirical issues suggest themselves. The first concerns the  production  and cost function
of firms that  provide services that  are valued by governments, and the impact of NGO status on
realized costs and quality. The second concerns the choices of governnments,  and the policies they
adopt to alternative providers of these services.
Within the first set of issues, it is instructive to examine the behavior of NGOs and for-profit
firms, and their responses to exogenous  events. Fbr example, comparing the activities of both types
across districts could reveal information about the responsiveness of NGOs to income shocks and
specific needs (e.g., health care).  Comparing these with the behavior of civil servants could also
be informative. Do NGOs act to complement direct public provision or substitute  for it, and are
these cross elasticities different between NGOs and other private sector providers? What kinds of
activities - health, education, credit, rural extension services, etc.  - are NGOs more likely to be
represented in?
Making direct comparisons between the way different types of providers are treated by govern-
ments - e.g., the  correlation between NGOness and the price paid by government for contracted
services  - may pose some data problems. Some  aspects of services are actively contracted out (e.g.,
food preparation in hospitals), but often the service itself is provided by government employees.
19In some cases however (e.g., Brazil) data  may be  available to examine the  issue of government
policy directly.  Alternatively, using time series data,  large changes in government expenditure
policy, such as those that  accompany macroeconomic adjustment  programs, may provide useful
information if expenditures cuts change the mix of NGO/non-NGO providers in predictable ways.
The introduction of external funding sources in section 4 suggests that  an  understanding of
donor behavior is also important.  For example, it would be worth knowing if the inputs of country
governments and donors are strategic complements or substitutes,  and if this  relationship differs
between the type of NGO used for project implementation (e.g., international versus grass roots).
Also, any correlation between the types of projects implemented through international and grass
roots NGOs could be used to test the  idea that  the  former may be preferred when the parties'
preferences are closely aligned, but  that  the  latter  is favored otherwise.  Do government-donor
partnerships survive better or longer under one arrangement than the other, and does the sectoral
focus of the program/project  affect the strength of the partnership  and hence its optimal design?
Analysis of the funding behavior of specific bilateral donor-country relationships over time could
yield useful insights in this case.
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